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Abstract
Recent monetary models with explicit microfoundations are made tractable by assuming
that agents have access to centralized markets after one round of decentralized trade. Given
quasi-linear preferences, this makes the distribution of money degenerate — which keeps the
models simple but precludes discussion of distributional e!ects of monetary policy. We gen-
eralize these models by assuming two rounds of trade before agents can readjust their money
holdings to study a range of new distributional e!ects analytically. We show that unex-
pected, symmetric lump-sum money injections may increase short-run output and welfare,
while asymmetric injections may increase long-run output and welfare.
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1 Introduction
Following Lagos and Wright (2004), recent monetary models with explicit micro-
foundations are made tractable by assuming that, between meetings of decentralized
markets, agents have access to a centralized market that allows them to rebalance
their money holdings. Given quasi-linear preferences, this makes the distribution of
money degenerate — which keeps the models simple but precludes discussion of the
distributional e!ects of policy. We generalize these models by assuming two rounds
of trade before agents can rebalance their money holdings. This entails little loss in
tractability, and allows us to study a wide range of new distributional e!ects related
to monetary policy. We show that unexpected lump-sum money injections may in-
crease short-run output and welfare. We also show that asymmetric money injections
may increase long-run output and welfare.
The notion of long-run money neutrality but short-run non-neutrality dates back
to Hume and has given rise to a large body of theoretical and empirical research (see
Lucas, 1996). It is clear from this research that the answer one obtains hinges on the
trading environment and the manner in which the money supply changes. Monetary
injections can be non-neutral if prices are rigid, there are informational frictions,
transfers are asymmetric, or there is a non-degenerate distribution of money. The
problem with many of these models is that money is either assumed exogenously to
be needed for trading or, if money is essential for trade, the models are so complex
that they cannot be studied analytically.2 We think that developing monetary models
2 Informational frictions generate non-neutralities for example in Lucas (1972), Katzman, Ken-
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that allow us analytically to study non-neutrality and possible e"ciency gains from
monetary policy requires constructing models where money is essential. Wallace
(1998) forcefully argues that we should construct models that explain why money is
necessary and then proceed to study how monetary policy a!ects the economy. Our
paper contributes to the growing literature in monetary economics that adopts this
strategy.
In particular, our model is an attempt to combine the simplicity of the Lagos
and Wright framework, as described above, with the ability to analyze distributional
e!ects analytically that arise in much more complicated models.3 The following re-
sults emerge. First, the Friedman rule, a policy that makes the expected return on
money equal to the real interest rate, attains the rst-best allocation. Moreover, at
the Friedman rule random monetary injections are neutral. Under this rule, hold-
ing money is costless so agents are never cash constrained no matter what money
shock prevails. This di!ers from Bewley’s (1980) model because agents do not face
an innite sequence of random consumption opportunities (see Green and Zhou 2004,
nan, and Wallace (2004), and Wallace (1997). Examples where non-neutralities occur because of
asymmetric injections are Kiyotaki and Wright (1993) type models, limited participation in nancial
markets (Lucas 1990, Fuerst 1992, Williamson 2004), segmented markets (Alvarez, Atkinson and
Kehoe 2002), or overlapping generation models. Heterogeneity in money holdings play a role in
for example in Scheinkman and Weiss (1986), Levine (1991), Imrohorglu (1992), Camera and Cor-
bae (1999), Molico (1999), Berentsen (2002), Deviatov and Wallace (2002), Zhu (2003), Berentsen,
Camera and Waller (2004) and Bhattacharya, Haslag and Martin (forthcoming).
3 Imrohorglu (1992) and Molico (1999) for example solve numerically for the distribution of money
holdings.
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forthcoming). Our framework gives agents a chance to readjust their money balances
after a nite number of trades. This has two consequences: it allows agents to undo
their trading histories in nite time and it makes the future predictable. Conse-
quently, in contrast to the Bewley model, the optimal quantity of money is nite,
and agents at the Friedman rule are willing to hold it since holding money is costless.
Second, away from the Friedman rule, random monetary injections can be non-
neutral even though all prices change proportionately. In particular, an unexpectedly
high money growth rate can cause aggregate output to increase. These results occur
even though injections are symmetric across agents and prices are fully exible. We
show that these non-neutralities only exist if the injections take place at a time when
the distribution of real balances is not degenerate. Essentially what a high money
injection provides is consumption insurance. This raises the question of whether
monetary policy can be used to provide consumption insurance in a deterministic
fashion. We therefore consider a deterministic version of the model where agents
receive asymmetric transfers. We show that changes in the asymmetry of transfers
have no real e!ects if the rate of ination is low. In contrast, for high rates of ination,
such a change can raise aggregate output and welfare permanently.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the environment. In Section
3 we discuss the agents’ decision problems and derive the equilibrium. In Section 4
we investigate the e!ects of asymmetric injections. The last section concludes. All
proofs are in the appendix.
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2 The Environment
The basic environment is that of Lagos and Wright (2004). Time is discrete and
in each period a [0! 1] continuum of innitely-lived agents trade on three Walrasian
markets, that open and close sequentially. Only one market, denoted by " = 1! 2! 3,
is open at any one time.4
One perishable good is produced and consumed by all agents. Before enter-
ing the rst two markets an agent receives one of two equally probable consump-
tion/production shocks. He may want to consume or produce but not both. As a
result, there is an equal number of consumers and producers in each market. Agents
get utility #($) from consuming $ % 0 in the rst two markets, where #0($) % 0,
#0(0) =!, #0(+!) = 0, #00($) & 0 and #000($) " 0. In the last market all agents con-
sume and produce, getting utility '($) from consuming $, with ' 0($) % 0, ' 0(0) =!,
' 0(+!) = 0 and ' 00($) & 0.5 Production of $ output generates disutility $. The
discount factor across dates is ( # (0! 1))
To rule out credit and motivate at monetary exchange, we assume anonymous
trading, no record-keeping and no enforcement of contracts. This is su"cient to
4 In addition of having two trading rounds before the centralized market opens, our set-up departs
from Lagos and Wright (2004) in two other dimensions. First, as in Rocheteau and Wright (2004)
we assume that all markets are Walrasian rather than assuming bilateral bargaining, since, although
one can get similar results under bargaining, this simplies the presentation. Second, in place of
random matching agents receive preference shocks at the beginning of the period that makes them
either buyers or sellers, as in Arouba, Waller and Wright (2004).
5The di!erence in preferences over the good sold in the last market is a technical device we use
to ensure a degenerate distribution of money holdings, at the beginning of a period.
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make a medium of exchange essential for trade (Kocherlakota, 1998), and given that
all goods are perishable, this role will be played by at money. In order to study
the non-neutralities of money we want to see how unexpected changes of the money
supply a!ect consumption and production. To this end, we assume that the law of
motion of the money stock is *! = +!*!"1, where +! is a random variable such that
+! =
!"#"$
+" = ,
¡
1 + -"
¢
with probability .
+# = ,
¡
1$ -#¢ with probability 1$ .)
We assume ,! -#! -" % 0 and . = $
!
$"+$!
so that / (+!) = ,.
Money is injected via lump-sum transfers 0 ! = (+! $ 1)*!"1, after the closing of
market 1 in period 1, but prior to the realization of individual trading shocks. In
short, at the beginning of the second market one of two states, denoted 2 = 3!4, can
be realized. In one state money growth is high, +" , in the other it is low, +#.
We refer to *!"1 as the beginning-of-period money supply for date 1. This is the
money supply existing in the economy before the shock takes place. We refer to *!
as the money supply present in the market at the end of period 1, after the shock is
realized. This is the money stock available at the beginning of period 1+ 1.
2.1 Sequential market trades
In period 1, let 5%&! be the nominal price in market "! and 6! = 1753&! be the real price
in the last market. We study equilibria where end-of-period real money balances are
time-invariant
(1) 6!*! = 6!+1*!+1)
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We refer to this as a stationary equilibrium. For this reason we omit the time subscript
when understood, and study a representative period working backwards from last to
rst market, within the period. In the steady state it then follows that prices change
instantly and proportionately since
(2)
6"
6"1
=
1
+"
and
6#
6"1
=
1
+#
where 6% is the price of money in state " = 4!3.
We also have that average ination is /
³
'#
'#+1
´
= / (+!) = ,! while the average
gross real return on money is
8 = /!
%
6!+1
6!
¸
= /!
%
*!
*!+1
¸
=
1
,
1 + -" $ -#
(1 + -") (1$ -#) %
1
9
!
which is negatively associated with expected ination ,. In our analysis we will focus
on 9 rather than , since 9 is proportional to ,.
Note that the Friedman rule in this model corresponds to a policy that sets the
expected return on money 1( equal to the real interest rate
1
) . This implies that with
a stochastic policy the Friedman rule requires less deation than in a deterministic
model, i.e., it requires the average gross ination rate , to be above (. To see this
observe that , % 9 since 1+$""$!(1+$")(1"$!) % 1. In fact, the Friedman rule may require a
positive average rate of ination. For example, if - = -" = -#, then one can show
that the ination under the Friedman rule is strictly positive if - %
&
1$ (.
Let :%(;%) denote the expected value from trading in market " with ;% money.
Let $%* and $%+ respectively denote the quantities bought or sold by an agent trading
in market ". We let $!3 satisfy ' 0($!3) = 1 and $! satisfy #0($!) = 1.
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2.1.1 The last market
In the last market agents can produce and consume. They choose how much to buy,
$3*, how much to sell, $3+, and how much money to take into the next period, ;1&+1.
As a result, the representative agent’s program is
:3 (;3) = max
,3$&,3%&-1&+1
[' ($3*)$ $3+ + (:1 (;1&+1)]
s.t. $3* + 6;1&+1 = $3+ + 6;3
Substituting for $3+ yields
(3) :3 (;3) = 6;3 +max [' ($3*)$ $3* $ 6;1&+1 + (:1 (;1&+1)]
where ($3*!;1&+1) are choice variables, hence the conditions for maximization are
(4)
' 0 ($3*) = 1
$6+ (: 01 (;1&+1) = 0)
The envelope condition is
(5) : 03 (;3) = 6.
There are two key results. First, trades are always e"cient in the last market, since
$3* = $
!
3 always and for every agent. Second, and most importantly, the distribution
of beginning-of-period money holdings is degenerate. This is because ;1&+1 is chosen
independently of ;3. It follows that in equilibrium everyone exits the last market
with identical money holdings, regardless of how much money they brought into the
last market. Those who bring excessive money into the last market, spend some on
goods, while those with too little money sell output.6 This feature of the Lagos and
6Conditions need to be imposed to ensure !%3 ! 0" See later.
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Wright model makes the distribution of money degenerate at the beginning of market
one.
2.1.2 The second market
Conditional on the realization of the shock +!, an agent who has ;2 money balances
at the opening of the second market, at any date 1, has expected lifetime utility
(6) :2 (;2) =
1
2
[# ($2*) + :3 (;2 $ 52$2*)] + 1
2
[$$2+ + :3 (;2 + 52$2+)] )
Here 52$2* is the amount of money spent when buying $2* goods, and 52$2+ is the
money received when selling $2+ goods.
The agent chooses quantities to buy and sell, taking the price 52 as given. Specif-
ically, as a seller, the agent chooses $2+ to maximize $$2+ + :3 (;2 + 52$2+). This
yields the rst-order condition
(7) 52: 03 (;2 + 52$2+) = 1 ' 52 = 53 =
1
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where we have used (5). That is prices in the last two markets must be equal and
are pinned down by the value of money in the last market. The intuition is that the
seller can acquire a unit of money in the second or the third market and will do so
at the lowest cost. Since sellers have linear production costs, if 52 % 53 it is cheaper
to acquire money in the second market and vice versa if 52 & 53. At price 52 = 53
sellers are indi!erent. This also implies that they are willing to supply all that is
demanded, so the supply curve in the second market is at.7
7With a strictly convex cost function, the rst-order condition is '2
(0()2!) = #3. This would make
the analysis more complicated but it would not change the results qualitatively.
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As a buyer, the agent chooses $2* to maximize his expected utility # ($2*) +
:3 (;2 $ 52$2*), given the constraint 52$2* ( ;2. Letting <2 " 0 be the multiplier
on this constraint, the conditions for maximization are
(8)
#0 ($2*) = 52: 03 (;2 $ 52$2*) + 52<2
<2(;2 $ 52$2*) = 0)
We can now state
Lemma 1 Let ;! = $!76) In equilibrium, if
(i) ;2 & ;! then <2 % 0, $2* = 6;2 & $! and :2 (;2) is strictly increasing and
concave;
(ii) ;2 " ;! then <2 = 0, $2* = $! ( 6;2 and :2 (;2) is strictly increasing and
linear.
The key implication is that trades in the second market are ine"cient, $2* & $!,
if the buyer is cash constrained, ;2 & ;!. Otherwise, they are e"cient. To see why,
in the appendix we show that if the constraint is binding,
(9) : 02 (;2) =
6
2
£
#0 ($2*) + 1
¤
% 6
whereas if it is not binding
(10) : 02 (;2) = 6)
Intuitively, if ;2 " ;!, then a buyer spends only part of his money and carries
the rest into the last market. Thus, the marginal value of money for an agent entering
market 2 with ;2 " ;! is simply 6. The reason is, whether he ends up buying or
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selling, the agent will not spend all his balances. If the agent enters market 2 with
less than ;!, however, he is constrained as a buyer. Therefore, the marginal value of
money is greater than 6 and has two components. With probability 172, the agent
sells so he does not spend any money and values an extra dollar simply by 6. With
probability one half the agent buys, in which case an extra dollar buys 6 goods giving
marginal utility #0 ($2*).
2.1.3 The rst market
An agent starting a period with ;1 money has expected lifetime utility
(11) :1 (;1) =
1
2
[# ($1*) +/:2 (;1 $ 51$1* + 0)]+ 1
2
[$$1+ +/:2 (;1 + 51$1+ + 0)]
where 51$1+ and 51$1* are, respectively, the amounts of money received as a seller
and spent as a buyer. Notice that agents take into account that they will receive a
random nominal transfer 0 at the beginning of market 2.
As a seller, the agent chooses $1+ to maximize $$1+ + /:2 (;1 + 51$1+), taking
the price 51 as given. This yields the rst-order condition
(12) 51/: 02 (;1 + 51$1+ + 0) = 1.
Production takes place until the expected marginal value of money, /: 02 (;1 + 51$1+ + 0),
equals its real price 1751. This money can be used to buy consumption in markets
that open later.
As a buyer, the agent chooses $1* to maximize # ($1*) + /:2 (;1 $ 51$1* + 0)
subject to the constraint 51$1* ( ;1. Letting <1 " 0 be the multiplier on this
11
constraint, the conditions for maximization are
(13)
#0 ($1*) = 51/: 02 (;1 $ 51$1* + 0) + 51<1
<1(;1 $ 51$1*) = 0)
We then have
Lemma 2 In equilibrium <1 = 0! $1* = $1+ = $1 ( $!, $1 & ;1751, and :1 (;1) is
strictly increasing and concave.
The main implication of Lemma 2 is that $1 & ;1751. The marginal value of
consuming even a little bit in the second market is very high for every agent, should
a consumption opportunity arise. Consequently, agents always want to carry some
cash into the second market.
We also have
(14) : 01 (;1) =
1
251
£
#0 ($1*) + 1
¤
that is, the marginal value of money at the opening of the rst market is given by
an expression similar to (9). The di!erence is that 1752 is equal to 6 whereas 1751
may not be. This possible price dispersion across markets plays a role in some of our
results.
3 Equilibria
A key feature of our model is that the idiosyncratic consumption and production
shocks generate intra-period heterogeneity in money balances. As we demonstrate
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later, the existence of a non-degenerate distribution of money holdings is what opens
the door to possible benecial e!ects of money creation in the short-run.
More precisely, every agent enters a period with;1 = *"1 money, i.e., the money
stock from the prior period (see Figure 1). Then, agents are randomly divided into
buyers and sellers in market 1. Buyers reduce their money holdings by 51$1 and
sellers acquire 51$1. Then the money injection occurs. Consequently, when the
second market opens half of the agents will be ‘poor’, holding *"1+0 $51$1 units of
money, and half will be ‘rich’, holding *"1 + 0 + 51$1. Then, agents will once more
be divided into sellers and buyers. Since the marginal cost of production is constant
in equilibrium sellers are indi!erent to how much to produce. For simplicity, we
assume that all sellers produce the same amount.8 Therefore, when market 3 opens
the support of the distribution of money will have four mass points. However, all
agents leave market 3 with the same money holdings ;1&+1 = * .
8This indi!erence would vanish if we had increasing marginal cost. However, it would greatly
complicate the analysis without changing the basic results.
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Sequence of events
From what we have learned so far, consumption may di!er across buyers only in
the second market, due to heterogeneity in money holdings. Thus, let ($./2 ! $
0/
2 ) and
(<./2 ! <
0/
2 ) denote the values of consumption and multipliers of, respectively, poor and
rich buyers in market 2, contingent on the realization of state 2 = 3!4. If, by a small
abuse in notation, we let $2 = ($
."
2 ! $
.#
2 ! $
0"
2 ! $
0#
2 ), <2 = (<
."
2 ! <
.#
2 ! <
0"
2 ! <
0#
2 ), and let
;¯% denote the vector of possible money holdings at the opening of market " we can
state the following
Denition 1 A stationary monetary equilibrium is a list {5% ! $% !;%}3%=1 and {<1! <2}
that satisfy (1)-(4), (6)-(8), and (11)-(13).
In the proof of Proposition 1 we show that there exist critical values 91 ( 92 ( 93
such that the following is true.
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Proposition 1 A stationary monetary equilibrium exists only if 9 " (. An equilib-
rium exists and is unique for 9 # ((! 92] where
i) for 9 # ((! 91], $.#2 & $."2 = $! and $0#2 = $0"2 = $!;
ii) for 9 # (91! 92], $.#2 & $."2 & $! and $0#2 = $0"2 = $!)
For 9 % 92 if an equilibrium exists then
iii) for 9 # (92! 93], $.#2 & $."2 & $! and $0"2 & $0#2 = $!;
iv) for 9 % 93, $
.#
2 & $
."
2 & $
! and $0"2 & $0#2 & $!)
Since 9 is monotonically increasing in the expected gross ination rate ,, Propo-
sition 1 also characterizes the monetary equilibrium as a function of ,. When 9 & 92
we refer to this economy as the low ination economy, and when 9 " 92 we call
it the high ination economy. In the low ination economy rich buyers are never
constrained. In the high ination economy they can be constrained. Although we
cannot prove existence of equilibrium for general utility functions when ination is
high, we can do so for particular functions.
Corollary 1 All quantities less than $! are strictly decreasing in 9 and approach $!
as 9 ) (. Consequently, the Friedman rule attains the rst-best allocation.
Corollary 1 is a standard result. An increase in the money growth rate decreases
the value of money which reduces consumption (e.g. see Lagos and Wright 2004 or
Shi 1997). In contrast to Lagos and Wright (2004) we obtain the rst-best under the
Friedman rule because we have competitive markets and not Nash bargaining.
It is worthwhile to note that under the Friedman rule randomness of the monetary
policy rule is completely irrelevant for the allocation in the rst two markets. That
15
is the rst-best is attained for any policy which involves 9 ) (. To see this note that
if the policy is deterministic, i.e. -" = -# = 0, then the Friedman rule requires that
, ) (. If the policy is random, the rule requires that , (1+$")(1"$!)1+$""$! ) (. In both
cases, all buyers consume $! is the rst two markets. The intuition is that under the
Friedman rule, the expected opportunity cost of holding money is zero so agents take
enough money to buy the e"cient quantity in both markets for all states.
Proposition 2 Shocks to the money supply are non-neutral in the short run.
Proposition 2 summarizes the main result of our paper: monetary shocks have
real e!ects for individual agents in all equilibria. The non-neutrality is a direct
consequence of the distribution of money holdings. However, there is no persistence
on quantities from these shocks. So all real e!ects are temporary. It can be shown
that random injections in Lagos and Wright (2004) are neutral regardless of when
they occur. The same is true in our model if they occur when the distribution is
degenerate, i.e. in markets 1 or 3.
The intuition for this result is straightforward. After any shock to the money
supply prices change proportionately. When money is higher than expected, the price
increase reduces the real balances of every agent, acting as a proportional tax on their
money holdings. Since in market 2money holdings are heterogeneous, those who hold
less cash are taxed less than those who hold more. This allows poor buyers–who
are cash strapped–to increase their consumption in market 2 because the lump-
sum transfer more than o!sets the ination tax. In contrast, rich buyers lose real
wealth even after accounting for the lump-sum transfer. This does not a!ect their
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consumption when ination is low because in this case rich buyers are not constrained
by their cash holdings. However, if ination is high the ination tax created by the
surprise injection reduces the consumption of rich buyers because they are also cash
constrained in market 2. E!ectively, an unanticipated increase in the money stock
redistributes real wealth from those with more to those with less through the price
increase.
Proposition 3 Consider an unexpected increase in the money supply. For 9 & 93
aggregate output is higher than average. For 9 " 93 aggregate output is una!ected by
the money supply shock.
It is clear that aggregate output is increasing in the low ination economy since
rich buyers do not change their consumption while poor buyers consume more. In
contrast, in the high ination economy when all agents are constrained, i.e. case (iv)
in Proposition 1, aggregate output is una!ected by the monetary shock since rich
buyers reduce their consumption by the same amount as the poor buyers increase
theirs.
In summary, the short-run non-neutralities of our model hinge on three key el-
ements. First, monetary injections must be unanticipated. Second, such injections
must take place when agents hold di!erent amounts of money. Third, ination cannot
be out of hand, otherwise every buyer would be cash constrained and so aggregate
output is una!ected. What our results do not hinge on are any price rigidities, infor-
mation frictions, or asymmetric injections across agents. Similar e!ects are reported
for example in Molico (1999). In contrast to his model, our results do not rely on
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numerical simulations, but are derived analytically.
4 Consumption insurance
Clearly, the high money shock is welfare improving. It raises consumption of poor
buyers without a!ecting the consumption of the rich buyers in the low ination
equilibrium. Although it lowers their consumption in the high ination economy, it
also increases the poor buyers’ consumption by the same amount. Since the rich have
a lower marginal utility of consumption than the poor there is still a potential for
welfare gains from this redistribution. Unfortunately, the low money supply shock
does just the opposite. So it is hard to imagine that these random injections improve
welfare on average. From the perspective of the representative agent at the start of
market 1, a high money shock acts like consumption insurance. This suggests that
a scheme that transfers real balances from agents when they are rich to when they
are poor in all periods would be welfare improving. In the following we explore this
issue.
Let us assume that +" = +# = 9 so that the money supply is deterministic. With
this process the only possible equilibrium allocations are the ones described in (ii)
and (iv) of Proposition 1. From (ii) in Proposition 1 rich buyers are unconstrained
and from (iv) they are constrained.
Assume further that the perfectly anticipated lump-sum transfer received by
agents depends on their trading state in the rst market as follows. Each agent
who drew a consumption opportunity in the rst market gets the transfer 0.! =
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(9 $ 1)=*! and each agent who drew a production opportunity gets the transfer
0 0! = (9 $ 1) (2$ =)*! where = # [0! 2]. This allows us to consider, for example,
symmetric transfers (= = 1) as in the previous section, transfers only to the poor
(= = 2) and transfers only to the rich (= = 0).
Our new assumptions do not a!ect the equations in the second and last markets.
In the rst market an agent with ;1 units of money has expected lifetime utility
(15) :1 (;1) =
1
2
[# ($1*) + :2 (;1 $ 51$1* + 0.)] + 1
2
[$$1+ + :2 (;1 + 51$1+ + 0 0)]
The perfectly anticipated transfers 0. and 0 0 are new in equation (15). Accordingly,
the rst-order conditions of the sellers (12) and the buyers (13) have to be modied
to take these new transfers into account.
In the following we analyze how a change in = a!ects steady state production and
consumption in markets 1 and 2.
Proposition 4 In the low ination economy, changes in = have no e!ect on indi-
vidual or aggregate consumption in markets 1 and 2. In the high ination economy
if 9 6= 1, changes in = are non-neutral.
Surprisingly, a change in = does not have any real e!ects when ination is low.
The only e!ect is that the steady state value of real money balances decreases. In
contrast, if ination is high changes in = are non-neutral.
What is the intuition for this result? Changes in = have di!erent e!ects on the
relative prices across markets. In the low ination economy all prices are the same,
i.e. 51 = 52 = 53 = 176. Thus, any changes in = causes all prices to change pro-
portionately. Since relative prices between markets 1 and 2 are una!ected, market
19
1 consumption does not change. But then, by the inter-market Euler equation, con-
sumption of the poor buyers in market 2 cannot change. Finally, since the rich buyers
continue to consume $! in market 2, their consumption is not a!ected.
In the high ination economy there is price dispersion across markets since 51 &
52 = 53. The price in market 1 depends on the marginal value of money in market
2, which in contrast to the low ination economy is non-linear in =. Then, changes
in = change the relative price between markets 1 and 2. As a consequence, agents
change their consumption patterns. More intuitively, an increase in = reduces the
money holdings of rich agents in market 2 and, because they are cash constrained
in this equilibrium, this increases their marginal value of money. Since they are the
sellers in market 1, they choose to sell more in market 1 to acquire additional cash.
By selling more, they lower 51 relative to 52 and so buyers nd it optimal to consume
more in market 1.
We dene welfare as the life-time expected utility of a representative agent at the
beginning of the period.
Proposition 5 For 9 % 1, welfare is increasing in =. For 9 & 1, if an equilibrium
exists, welfare is decreasing in =.
The reason welfare increases is that an increase in = provides consumption in-
surance in market 2 - agents give up consumption when they are rich but increase
it when they are poor. Given our assumptions on preferences, this insurance lowers
the expected marginal utility of consumption in market 2 which induces agents to
increase consumption in market 1.
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5 Conclusion
We have presented a framework in which a monetary expansion, while neutral in the
long-run, can have benecial e!ects in the short-run. The key feature of our model
is that agents trade on a sequence of markets while being subject to idiosyncratic
shocks. For this reason, there is equilibrium heterogeneity in money balances, so
that one-time monetary transfers can be used to redistribute liquidity from rich to
poor. Since an unexpectedly high money growth rate redirects consumption to those
who most value it, welfare is positively a!ected.
The short-run non-neutralities of our model hinge on three elements. First, mon-
etary injections must be unanticipated. Second, such injections must take place when
agents hold di!erent amounts of money. Third, average ination cannot be too high,
otherwise aggregate output is una!ected. What our results do not hinge on are any
price rigidities, asymmetric information, or asymmetric injections across agents, de-
vices that have been used in the literature to generate short-run non-neutralities of
money. Finally, we show that by providing consumption insurance, fully anticipated
asymmetric lump-sum transfers increase aggregate output and welfare in the high
ination economy. Surprisingly, such a scheme has no real e!ects when ination is
low.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. If the constraint is not binding then <2 = 0. Using (8)
then #0 ($2*) = 1. Here trades are e"cient. The buyer spends $!76 money, and we let
;! = $!76 denote money holdings such that the constraint on spending does not bind.
If the constraint is binding, <2 % 0, then (8) implies #0 ($2*) = 1+12' and 52$2* = ;2)
Here trades are ine"cient. The buyer spends all his money, 52$2* = ;2 & ;!, and
consumes $2* = ;2752 & $!.
To examine concavity of :2 di!erentiate (6) with respect to ;2 to get
: 02 (;2) =
1
2
h
#0 ($2*) 2,2$2-2 + :
0
3 (;2 $ 52$2*)
³
1$ 52 2,2$2-2
´i
+12
h
$2,2%2-2 + : 03 (;2 + 52$2+)
³
1 + 52
2,2%
2-2
´i
Then (7), (8) and 6 = 1752 imply that
(16) : 02 (;2) =
1
252
£
#0 ($2*) + 1
¤
+
1
2
<2
%
1$ 52 >$2*
>;2
¸
If <2 = 0, then #0 ($2*) = 1 and : 02 (;2) = 6, so :2 (;2) is linear in ;2 for ; " ;!.
If <2 % 0, then 52$2* = ;2, which implies that 1 $ 52 2,2$2-2 = 0. Hence, : 02 (;2) =
6
h
30(,2$)+1
2
i
% 6 since #0 ($2*) % 1. Note that : 002 (;2) & 0 because
2,2$
2-2
% 0, so that
:2(;2) is concave *;2 & ;!)¥
Proof of Lemma 2. First prove that <1 = 0 always. Suppose <1 % 0. Then ;2 = 0
and $2* = 0 implying #0 (0) = 1 + <276, which is not possible since #0(0) =!. Thus
<1 = 0, in which case (12)-(13) yield
(17) #0 ($1*) =
/: 02 (;1 $ 51$1* + 0)
/: 02 (;1 + 51$1+ + 0)
)
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If ;1 $ 51$1* & ;! then /:2(;1 $ 51$1* + 0) is concave, hence #0 ($1*) % 1 and
$1* & $
!) If ;1$ 51$1* " ;! then both numerator and denominator are linear, hence
#0 ($1*) = 1 and $1* = $!. Hence, $1* ( $!)
Di!erentiating (11) with respect to ;1
: 01 (;1) =
1
2
h
#0 ($1*) 2,1$2-1 +/:
0
2 (;1 $ 51$1* + 0)
³
1$ 51 2,1$2-1
´i
+12
h
$2,1%2-1 +/: 02 (;1 + 51$1+ + 0)
³
1 + 51
2,1%
2-1
´i
Using (12) and (13) (for <1 = 0) yields
: 01 (;1) =
1
251
£
#0 ($1*) + 1
¤
Thus, if $1* & $! then :1 (;1) is strictly increasing and concave.
Since everyone enters the rst market with identical money balances, and there
is an identical number of buyers and sellers, in equilibrium, $1* = $1+ = $1)¥
Proof of Proposition 1. The shock to the money supply is realized before the
second market opens. Thus, 52 adjusts instantly and proportionately to the change
in the money stock, and so does the expected value of 6) Then (2) implies that
6"
/6
= ?" % 1$ -
#
1 + -" $ -# & 1(18)
6#
/6
= ?# % 1 + -
"
1 + -" $ -# % 1(19)
where ?/ is the price of money in state 2 = 4!3 relative to the expected price. It
does not depend on ,. Note that ?" & ?#, so when the money shock is high the
price of money is low.
Suppose rst that <.2 = <
0
2 = 0 for all states. Then $2* = $
! for all agents
in all states. Therefore as shown in Lemma 1 we have : 02 (;2) = 6 and therefore
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/: 02 (;2) = /6. Then from the rst-order condition of the buyer in market 1 (13)
we have #0($1)751 = /6 and from the rst-order condition of the seller in market 1
(12) we have 51 = 17/6. Finally, (14) implies that the marginal value of money at
the beginning of a period is equal to the expected value at the end of the period
: 01 (;1) = /6
This condition says that if agents take a unit of money into the rst market but do
not intend to spend it in either the rst or second markets, then the value of this extra
unit of money is the goods it buys in the last market. Substituting this expression
into (4), and backdating it, gives
(20) 6"1
%
(/
µ
6
6"1
¶
$ 1
¸
= 6"1 ((79 $ 1) ( 0.
For (79 & 1 this expression is negative implying ;1 = 0 which cannot be an equi-
librium. For (79 % 1 agents want to hold an innite amount of money, since its rate
of return is greater than the discount rate. This also cannot be an equilibrium. For
(79 = 1! there is an innity of monetary equilibria, one for each value of 6"1.
Suppose <02 % <
.
2 = 0 in one or both states. From (8) this is a contradiction since
;2 is larger for rich agents.
Now consider the remaining possibilities.
Equilibrium 1: <.#2 % 0 and <
."
2 = <
0#
2 = <
0"
2 = 0) In this case, $
."
2* =
$0"2* = $
0#
2* = $
! and $.#2* & $
!. First, we determine $1. As shown in Lemma 1,
: 02 (;1 + 51$1+ + 0) = 6, thus /: 02 (;1 + 51$1+ + 0) = /6. Using (12), we have
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51 = 17/6. Next, (14) implies that
2: 01 (;1) = /6
£
#0 ($1) + 1
¤
Finally, (4) can be backdated to get
26"1
(
= /6
£
#0 ($1) + 1
¤
)
Since 179 = /676"1 then
(21) #0 ($1) = 1 + 2
µ
9 $ (
(
¶
Because of strict concavity of #($) there is a unique value $1 that solves (21), and for
( & 9! $1 & $
!) As 9 ) (! #0 ($1)) 1 and $1 ) $!.
Next we determine the real money balances !. Using (17) and noting that $.#2* =
6#*# $ ?#$1 where 6#*# = ! we get
(22) 2#0 ($1) = (1$ .) ?#
£
#0
¡
!$ ?#$1
¢
+ 1
¤
+ 2.?"
For a given value of $1! it is straightforward to show that a unique value of ! exists.
It then follows that since the poor buyer spends all of his money in markets one
and two, when the state is 2 = 4, with *# = +#*"1 we have $.#2* = !$?#$1. Then,
6# =
!
*#
, 6" =
!
*"
and 1751 = (1$ .) !
*#
+ .
!
*"
)
Finally, for this equilibrium to exist it must be the case that
$.#2* = !$ ?#$1 & $! and $."2* = $! ( !$ ?"$1
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which implies
(23) $! + ?"$1 & ! & $! + ?#$1)
Since $.#2* = !$?#$1 and ! & $!+?#$1, then it follows that $.#2* & $!. As 9 ) (!
$1 ) $! and !) $!
¡
1 + ?#
¢
. Since (22) yields
@!
@$1
= ?# +
2#00($1)
(1$ .)#00
³
$.#2*
´
?#
% ?#
as 9 increases from (! ! falls faster than the right-hand inequality in (23). For a
su"ciently high value of 9, call it 91, the left-hand inequality will bind and beyond
that will be violated. Hence, for 9 # ((! 91] this equilibrium exists. Note, if -# =
-" = 0 this equilibrium cannot exist for any 9.
Equilibrium 2: <.2 % 0 and <
0
2 = 0 for both states. In this case, $
0"
2* = $
0#
2* = $
!.
Consequently, Lemma 1 implies that /: 02 (;1 + 51$1+ + 0) = /6 and the rst-order
condition of the seller in market 1 implies that 1751 = /6.
By using the same procedure as before one can show that the solution for $1 is
once again given by (21).
To nd the real money balances ! use (17) to get
2#0 ($1) = (1$ .) ?#
£
#0
¡
!$ ?#$1
¢
+ 1
¤
+ .?"
£
#0
¡
!$ ?"$1
¢
+ 1
¤
Again a unique value of ! exists. Using the solutions for ! and $1 we obtain
$."2* = !$ ?"$1 % $.#2* = !$ ?#$1
6# =
!
*#
, 6" =
!
*"
and 1751 = (1$ .) !
*#
+ .
!
*"
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For this equilibrium to exist we need that the poor buyers’ money balances satisfy
$.#2* = !$ ?#$1 & $! and $."2* = !$ ?"$1 & $!
while the rich buyers’ money balances satisfy
!+ ?#$1 % $
! and !+ ?"$1 % $!
Combining these two sets of inequalities, the su"cient condition for this equilibrium
is
$! $ ?"$1 & ! & $! + ?"$1
At 91! the right-hand inequality binds. As 9 increases above 91 once again ! falls
faster than $1. Finally at some 92 % 91 the left-hand inequality binds. Thus for
9 # (91! 92] this equilibrium exists.
Equilibrium 3: <."2 ! <
.#
2 ! <
0"
2 % 0 and <
0#
2 = 0. In this case, $
0#
2* = $
! and
$0"2* ! $
.#
2* ! $
."
2* & $
!. Consequently, Lemma 1 implies that
: 02 (;2) =
1
252
£
#0 ($02*) + 1
¤
Using (12) and (7) yields
(24)
1
51
=
6"
2?"
©
.?"
£
#0
¡
$0"2*
¢
+ 1
¤
+ 2 (1$ .) ?#ª
Then, (14) implies that
: 01 (;1) =
6"
4?"
©
.?"
£
#0
¡
$0"2*
¢
+ 1
¤
+ 2 (1$ .) ?#ª £#0 ($1) + 1¤
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Finally, (4) can be backdated to get
(25)
49
(
=
©
.?"
£
#0
¡
!+ 6"51$1
¢
+ 1
¤
+ 2 (1$ .) ?#ª £#0 ($1) + 1¤ )
where $0"2* = !+ 6
"51$1.
Then use (17) to get
(26) 2#0 ($1) = .?"
£
#0
¡
!$ 6"51$1
¢
+ 1
¤
+ (1$ .) ?#
%
#0
µ
!$ ?
#
?"
6"51$1
¶
+ 1
¸
Then solving (24), (25) and (26) yields 6"51, $1 and !.
Using the solutions for ! and $1 we obtain
$0"2* = !+ 6
"51$1 % $
."
2* = !$ 6"51$1 % $.#2* = !$
?#
?"
6"51$1
6# =
!
*#
, 6" =
!
*"
For this equilibrium to exist we need that the poor buyers’ money balances satisfy
$.#2* = !$
+"
+#
6"51 & $
! and $."2* = !$ 6"51$1 & $!
while the rich buyers’ money balances satisfy
!+ 6"51$1 & $
! & !+
?#
?"
6"51$1
Combining these two sets of inequalities, the su"cient condition for this equilibrium
is
$! $ ?
#
?"
6"51$1 & ! & $
! $ 6"51$1
At 92! the right-hand inequality binds. As 9 increases above 92 once again ! falls
faster than 6"51$1. Finally at some 93 % 92 the left-hand inequality binds. Thus for
9 # (92! 93] this equilibrium exists if a solution to (24), (25) and (26) exists. Note, if
-# = -" = 0 this equilibrium cannot exist for any 9 % (.
28
Equilibrium 4: <."2 ! <
.#
2 ! <
0"
2 ! <
0#
2 % 0. In this case, $
."
2* ! $
.#
2* ! $
0"
2* ! $
0#
2* & $
!. Con-
sequently, Lemma 1 implies that
: 02 (;2) =
1
252
£
#0 ($02*) + 1
¤
Using (12) and (7) yields
(27)
1
51
=
6"
2?"
©
.?"
£
#0
¡
$0"2*
¢
+ 1
¤
+ (1$ .) ?# £#0 ¡$0#2* ¢+ 1¤ª
Then, (14) implies that
: 01 (;1) =
6"
4?"
©
.?"
£
#0
¡
$0"2*
¢
+ 1
¤
+ (1$ .) ?# £#0 ¡$0#2* ¢+ 1¤ª £#0 ($1) + 1¤
Finally, (4) can be backdated to get
(28)
49
(
=
©
.?"
£
#0
¡
$0"2*
¢
+ 1
¤
+ (1$ .) ?# £#0 ¡$0#2* ¢+ 1¤ª £#0 ($1) + 1¤
where $0"2* = !+ 6
"51$1 and $0#2* = !+
4!
4"
6"51$1.
Use (17) to get
(29) #0 ($1) =
.?"
2
£
#0
¡
!$ 6"51$1
¢
+ 1
¤
+
(1$ .) ?#
2
%
#0
µ
!$ ?
#
?"
6"51$1
¶
+ 1
¸
Then solving (27), (28) and (29) yields 6"51! $1 and !.
Using the solutions for ! and $1 we obtain
$0#2* = !+
?#
?"
6"51$1, $0"2* = !+ 6
"51$1,
$."2* = !$ 6"51$1, $.#2* = !$
?#
?"
6"51$1
6# =
!
*#
, 6" =
!
*"
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From theses solutions we get $0#2* % $
0"
2* % $
."
2* % $
.#
2* )
For this equilibrium to exist we need that the rich buyers’ money balances satisfy
$0#2* = !+
?#
?"
6"51$1 & $
!
respectively
! & $! $ ?
#
?"
6"51$1
As indicated above this inequality binds at 93. As 9 increases above 93 once again !
falls faster than 6"51$1. Thus for 9 " 93 this equilibrium exists if a solution to (27),
(28) and (29) exists.
Finally, it is straightforward to show that $3 = $!3 in all states and in all periods.
To ensure that the richest agents have non-negative production we need to impose
that $!3 " 2$!. This requires scaling of ' ($) such that this condition holds.¥
Proof of Proposition 3. Average aggregate output in market 2 is
.
³
$.#2* + $
0#
2*
´
+ (1$ .)
³
$."2* + $
0"
2*
´
)
Consider all possible equilibria.
In case (i) of Proposition 1 we have $.#2* & $
0#
2* = $
."
2* = $
0"
2* = $
!) If an unantic-
ipated increase in money takes place aggregate output realized is $."2* + $
0"
2* = 2$
!!
which is higher than average aggregate output since
.
³
$.#2* + $
!
´
+ (1$ .)2$! & 2$!)
In case (ii) of Proposition 1 we know have $.#2* & $
."
2* & $
0#
2* = $
0"
2* = $
!. In state
2 = 3 aggregate output is $."2* + $
! % $.#2* + $
!) Thus
.
³
$.#2* + $
!
´
+ (1$ .)($."2* + $!) & $."2* + $!
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i.e. aggregate output is larger than average aggregate output if 2 = 3.
In case (iii) of Proposition 1 we have $.#2* & $
."
2* & $
0"
2* & $
0#
2* = $
!. We also know
that
$0"2* = !+ 6
"51$1 % $
."
2* = !$ 6"51$1 % $.#2* = !$
+"
+#
6"51$1
Thus, in state 2 = 3 aggregate output is $."2* + $
0"
2* = 2!. In state 2 = 4 we have
$.#2* + $
0#
2* = !$ 4
!
4"
6"51$1 + $
! & !$ 4!
4"
6"51$1 +!+
4!
4"
6"51$1 = 2!
since $! & !+ 4
!
4"
6"51$1 in this equilibrium. Thus average aggregate output is
.
³
$.#2* + $
0#
2*
´
+ (1$ .)2! & 2!)
i.e. aggregate output is larger than average aggregate output if 2 = 3.
In case (iv) of Proposition 1 we have $.#2* & $
."
2* & $
0"
2* & $
0#
2* & $
!. We also know
that
$0#2* = !+
?#
?"
6"51$1 % $
0"
2* = !+6
"51$1 % $
."
2* = !$6"51$1 % $.#2* = !$
?#
?"
6"51$1 .
Thus, in state 2 = 3 aggregate output is $."2* + $
0"
2* = 2!) In state 2 = 4 aggregate
output is $.#2* + $
0#
2* = 2!) Thus aggregate output is independent across states and it
is equal to average aggregate output.¥
Proof of Proposition 4. In the low ination economy, 51 = 52 = 176 and the
following equations determine $1 and $
.
2* :
#0($1) = 1 + 2
9 $ (
(
and #0($1) =
#0
¡
$.2*
¢
+ 1
2
)
Since neither of these expressions depend on =! the quantities $1and $
.
2* are una!ected
by a change in =) For a poor buyer we have 52$
.
2* = *"1 $ 51$1 + 0., respectively,
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$.2* + $1 = 6 (*"1 + 0
.). If the quantities bought by a poor buyer in markets one
and two do not change then 6 (*"1 + 0.) must remain the same. Thus,
>6
>=
= $ 6 (,$ 1)
1 + (,$ 1)= & 0 and
>6*
>=
& 0)
The proof for the high ination economy is by contradiction. In this equilibrium both
buyers spend all of their money in market two. This implies, noting that 6 = 1752,
the budget constraints satisfy
6 [*"1 + = (9 $ 1)*"1] = 651$1 + $.2*
6 [*"1 + (2$ =) (9 $ 1)*"1] = $651$1 + $02*
Now add and subtract 6 (1$ =) (9 $ 1)*"1 on the left hand side of the rst con-
straint and rewrite the second to get
6 [* $ (1$ =) (9 $ 1)*"1] = 651$1 + $.2*(30)
6 [* + (1$ =) (9 $ 1)*"1] = $651$1 + $02*(31)
Now conjecture that a change in = leaves the quantities unchanged. Then it must
also leave 651 una!ected since
1
651
=
: 02 (;1 + 51$1+ + 0)
6
=
1
2
£
#0 ($02*) + 1
¤
Totally di!erentiate (30) and (31) holding the right hand sides constant to get
@6
@=
= $ 6 (9 $ 1)*"1
[* $ (1$ =) (9 $ 1)*"1] = $
6 (9 $ 1)
[9 $ (1$ =) (9 $ 1)]
@6
@=
=
6 (9 $ 1)*"1
[* + (1$ =) (9 $ 1)*"1] =
6 (9 $ 1)
[9 + (1$ =) (9 $ 1)]
Clearly these expressions are unequal for 9 6= 1. As a result, the quantities must
change.¥
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Proof of Proposition 5. Life-time expected utility of the representative agent
equals
W (1$ () = 1
2
[# ($1)$ $1] + 1
4
[# ($02*)$ $02*] +
1
4
£
#
¡
$.2*
¢$ $.2*¤(32)
+' ($!3)$ $!3
Di!erentiating with respect to = yields
(33)
>W (1$ ()
>=
=
1
2
£
#0 ($1)$ 1
¤ >$1
>=
+
1
4
£
#0 ($02*)$ 1
¤ >$02*
>=
+
1
4
£
#0
¡
$.2*
¢$ 1¤ >$.2*
>=
In this equilibrium all of the quantities are less than $! so the bracketed terms are
all positive. We also know $.2* + $
0
2* = 6* so
>$02*
>=
= *
>6
>=
$ >$
.
2*
>=
Substitute in to obtain
>W (1$ ()
>=
=
1
2
£
#0 ($1)$ 1
¤ >$1
>=
+
1
4
£
#0
¡
$.2*
¢$ #0 ($02*)¤ >$.2*>=
+
1
4
£
#0 ($02*)$ 1
¤
*
>6
>=
To determine 5,156 ,
2,'2$
26 , and
5'
56 note that (27), (28), and (29) must hold with ?
" =
?# = 1 and quantities constant across states. Totally di!erentiate the resulting
expressions and evaluate the derivatives at = = 1. Then solve for 5,156 ,
5'
56 , and
5.1
56 to
get
@$1
@=
=
1
A
(9 $ 1) 5162
£
1 + #0 ($1)
¤
#00 ($02*)#
00 ¡$.2*¢
@6
@=
=
1
A
µ
9 $ 1
9
¶
6#00 ($1)
£
#00
¡
$.2*
¢$ #00 ($02*)¤
where
A = #00 ($1)#00
¡
$.2*
¢
+ #00 ($1)#00 ($02*) + 5
2
16
2#00 ($02*)#
00 ¡$.2*¢ £1 + #0 ($1) + $1#00 ($1)¤
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and we have set * = 1 for simplicity. A su"cient condition for A % 0 is 1+#0 ($1)+
$1#
00 ($1) " 0. This condition is satised for any CRRA utility function if the degree
of risk aversion is less or equal to 1.
We then have 5,156 % 0 if 9 % 1. Moreover, if
5,1
56 % 0, then
5,*2$
56 & 0 and
5,'2$
56 % 0. Thus, the rst two terms of (33) are strictly positive. Since #
000 ()) " 0
we have
£
#00
¡
$.2*
¢$ #00 ($02*)¤ ( 0 which implies that 2'26 % 0 if 9 % 1. Consequently,
2W(1"))
26 % 0 if 9 % 1. It is straightforward to show that
2W(1"))
26 & 0 if 9 & 1.¥
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